In January of 2003 the CEO of I/O let the company know that he was leaving to join Halliburton. That made working for the company much less attractive to me.
Around the same time a headhunter started calling me asking if I would be interested in joining a small software company that was recently created out of an industry sponsored consortium. I think my first interview was in December of 2002 I finally received an offer in May of 2003.
I started the job June 1, 2003. OpenSpirit had 18 employees at the time, and under $2 million in sales. Our cash position was precarious, and I was brought in to try and take this company to a stage where we could sell it.
The Company was dedicated to upstream (that is, exploration and production), subsurface (that is, seismic data and interpretations, well log data and interpretations, and other information associated with the view of the earth model), middleware (software that performs operations between data and applications. Think of plumbing.) Our clients were mostly the Information Technology and Data Management departments in the oil companies. The users were mostly geologists and geophysicists.
My first day on the job was in Stavanger, Norway. The EAGE (European Association of Geoscientists and Engineers) convention was being held there. We also had a user forum in town. It was an eye opening experience. The team was good, but the clients had many, many issues with the software. (Most of it focused on the speed of the operation and what sort of data the application move)
The company was funded with a reasonable amount of capital for the market size. There were a couple of other companies that were started at the same time with similar goals (Trade Ranger and PetroCosm were the two biggest. They each had investments of about $100 million each. We had, to this point, about $4.5 million)who crashed and burned well before I even started with OpenSpirit.
The Company was funded by Schlumberger Technology Company, Shell Technology Ventures, and Chevron Technology Ventures. Later, we added Paradigm Geophysical as a balancing partner to Schlumberger.
We did go through several small rounds of capital before we brought in a large round when Paradigm joined. In a small company like this, cash was always the problem that was hanging over your head. It didn't really help that nobody in the company has any experience working for a start-up. I would have company meetings regularly where I would express my discomfort at the state of our Balance Sheet. I found no commiseration. But by virtue of the fact that we were small and lean, we were able to make money for almost every year I was running the company.
We grew pretty strongly in the middle years of my tenure. We had a good team, though at times rather dysfunctional. I won't go into the details, but suffice it to say that management was fired, management quit, and the company survived in spite of both events. (de mortuis nil nisi bonum).
The decision to sell the company, and the process we went through deserve their own post.
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Friday, June 24, 2011
Input/Output: My life in manufacturing
You may have noticed a theme in most of my jobs to this point. The only company that actually made anything was Exxon. (S/N notwithstanding).
But now I was about to embark on a new branch of my career. I/O (now called Ion, if you are at all interested. Or maybe Inova, depending on what part of the company you are looking at) made stuff. We made seismic acquisition stuff. Geophones, Hydrophones, Seismic Cables, Land Acquisition Systems, Vibrator Trucks (not as sexy as their name implies), and everything to support the acquisition of seismic data.
Collecting seismic data is really doing nothing more than recording sound. Granted, you are recording sound from thousands of different sources located either on the trackless ocean or buried in the ground over many square miles, and then the sound waves need to be reconstructed so you can see what they bounced off of, many thousands of feet underground. (crazy stuff. The largest Seismic Vessels now (from PGS, thank you very much) can tow as many as 22 streamer cables, each about 8 km long. They are the largest man made moving things on earth). You can imagine that you need to know exactly where those geophones are located, and when, exactly you deploy the "source" of the sound waves (either explosives like dynamite or the vibe trucks mentioned above). It is complicated.
I was hired to run the Land Data Systems group. We were responsible for the new digital "geophone" (actually a MEMS accelerometer) the Central System, which is the computer that keeps track of where all the data is coming from and then puts it all in the right place, and the sales thereof.
It was a hard time in the oil business, and not many oil companies were collecting land data. And not many service companies were buying new seismic equipment. But we had a net technology (Vectorseis is what we called it) and were sort of effective. I had to cut my staff from over 160 people to under 70 people (which was not fun), outsource some manufacturing, and try and learn about things like "Long Lead Time Items" and "Inventory". Neither of these were too important (or even existed!) in the software or data world.
I had a good time learning these things. I would walk around our factory floor and pick things up (which you can't do with software) just to hold in my hand something I made.
We did pretty well considering the environment. We increases sales in the year I was there from about $3 million a quarter to about $8 million a quarter.
But soon enough some headhunters came calling. I was destined to get back into software. I worked for I/O for 14 months. There was such a strong culture there (and such a great CEO, who quit before I did) that I still consider myself an I/O Alumni.
But now I was about to embark on a new branch of my career. I/O (now called Ion, if you are at all interested. Or maybe Inova, depending on what part of the company you are looking at) made stuff. We made seismic acquisition stuff. Geophones, Hydrophones, Seismic Cables, Land Acquisition Systems, Vibrator Trucks (not as sexy as their name implies), and everything to support the acquisition of seismic data.
Collecting seismic data is really doing nothing more than recording sound. Granted, you are recording sound from thousands of different sources located either on the trackless ocean or buried in the ground over many square miles, and then the sound waves need to be reconstructed so you can see what they bounced off of, many thousands of feet underground. (crazy stuff. The largest Seismic Vessels now (from PGS, thank you very much) can tow as many as 22 streamer cables, each about 8 km long. They are the largest man made moving things on earth). You can imagine that you need to know exactly where those geophones are located, and when, exactly you deploy the "source" of the sound waves (either explosives like dynamite or the vibe trucks mentioned above). It is complicated.
I was hired to run the Land Data Systems group. We were responsible for the new digital "geophone" (actually a MEMS accelerometer) the Central System, which is the computer that keeps track of where all the data is coming from and then puts it all in the right place, and the sales thereof.
It was a hard time in the oil business, and not many oil companies were collecting land data. And not many service companies were buying new seismic equipment. But we had a net technology (Vectorseis is what we called it) and were sort of effective. I had to cut my staff from over 160 people to under 70 people (which was not fun), outsource some manufacturing, and try and learn about things like "Long Lead Time Items" and "Inventory". Neither of these were too important (or even existed!) in the software or data world.
I had a good time learning these things. I would walk around our factory floor and pick things up (which you can't do with software) just to hold in my hand something I made.
We did pretty well considering the environment. We increases sales in the year I was there from about $3 million a quarter to about $8 million a quarter.
But soon enough some headhunters came calling. I was destined to get back into software. I worked for I/O for 14 months. There was such a strong culture there (and such a great CEO, who quit before I did) that I still consider myself an I/O Alumni.
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Post Bankruptcy. A New Beginning
I am very happy to say that Bell Geospace was able to exit bankruptcy. I was an active participant in most of the proceedings, but I finally decided that it would be best if I passed the reigns on to the new president. He finished the job admirably, with one of our investors. I am also happy to say that the Company is surviving, even thriving, today.
After leaving BGI, my fiancee and I decided to take a break, and left the country for several months. While not technically a job, that trip is still a big part of why I am where I am today. It gives one plenty of perspective to take some time off and spend some time in beautiful places with someone you love. It focuses the mind strongly on what is, and what isn't important.
I use to have a website with photos and stories from that trip. But I used GeoCities,so it is all gone. I tried to capture most of the to blogger, but it is cumbersome. You can see the posts here, with a little work.
When we returned to the US, I took a couple of years where I consulted and generally enjoyed myself.
But all good things had to come to an end.
I made a small investment with a friend into a company that made solid streamer cables for seismic data acquisition. (The company originally had its manufacturing done in Mineral Wells. My friend had his own airplane, and to try and convince me to make an investment, he flew me and another friend up there from Houston. On take-off on our way home, he lost an engine. (luckily it had two). Funny way to try and raise money.)
We sold this company to Input/Output. They offered me a job as the Business Unit Manager of their Land Seismic Systems division. That was certainly a new thing for me, and it set me on a new and interesting path.
After leaving BGI, my fiancee and I decided to take a break, and left the country for several months. While not technically a job, that trip is still a big part of why I am where I am today. It gives one plenty of perspective to take some time off and spend some time in beautiful places with someone you love. It focuses the mind strongly on what is, and what isn't important.
I use to have a website with photos and stories from that trip. But I used GeoCities,so it is all gone. I tried to capture most of the to blogger, but it is cumbersome. You can see the posts here, with a little work.
When we returned to the US, I took a couple of years where I consulted and generally enjoyed myself.
But all good things had to come to an end.
I made a small investment with a friend into a company that made solid streamer cables for seismic data acquisition. (The company originally had its manufacturing done in Mineral Wells. My friend had his own airplane, and to try and convince me to make an investment, he flew me and another friend up there from Houston. On take-off on our way home, he lost an engine. (luckily it had two). Funny way to try and raise money.)
We sold this company to Input/Output. They offered me a job as the Business Unit Manager of their Land Seismic Systems division. That was certainly a new thing for me, and it set me on a new and interesting path.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Bankruptcy, and other learing experiences
In July of 1999, the Board of Directors of Bell Geospace asked me if I would be willing to take over at President and CEO. This was a hard decision. The guy I would be replacing was (and is) a friend of mine. And the Company was in a tight spot.
In spite of raising over $20 million in equity and $14 million in debt we were quickly running out of cash. We had to close several sales or an additional round of funding to make the company work.
Reluctantly, I said yes.
The Board put me into the role and I immediately had to hire a CFO. I ended up hiring a fellow who became a very close friend (battle scars). I kept telling him we had plenty of cash (well over a million dollars) but he never really asked how much we were spending. Alas, we were spending WAY too much.
So first we tried to raise more money. We had a term sheet from a young and up and coming Private Equity firm based in Lime Rock, CT. The problem was the "pre-money" valuation (that is, what share price they were willing to pay for our stock) was $12 million. Yipes! Our last "post-money" (after our last round of funding) valuation was $45 million. That was quite a "down round". None of the current investors were willing to see such dilution.
So we focused on sales. We really had a pretty spectacular growth rate - in 1998 we sold only about $200k worth of data, and in 1999 we sold over $2 million! But our burn rate (cash out minus cash in) was about $2.5 million a month. Yipes!
My CFO told me that we had to get relief from our debt obligations, or we would be in violation of our loan covenants. (you had to keep a certain amount of cash or the loan could be called. There were many of these types of rules we had to follow)
Our biggest debtor (other than the loan with Third Coast Capital) was with Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the instrument we were using to collect our data. We had a payment due in October, and if we paid it, all our loans would be called.
It seemed like it would be a simple thing to go to Lockheed and ask that we reschedule payments. (there is a lot of history that I am leaving out here. The instrument we had was delivered very late, which meant that we missed the oil price peak, which meant that oil companies were cutting back on exploration, which meant that nobody wanted to buy our data. For want of a nail...)
But nothing with a large government contractor is ever simple.
This division of Lockheed we were dealing with (Lockheed Martin Federal Systems - they also made submarines) had never had a private client before. They were so naive that when it was obvious that they were not going to make the contracted date for delivery of one of our instruments, they told us that the price was going up (!!). We pointed out that in the contract, if they missed delivery, they had to pay a penalty. They said it never worked that way with the government. (I guess!)
So my CFO and I showed up in Manassas, Virginia on September 30, 1999. We had a meeting arranged with the head of the division, her finance guy, and a bunch of other people who didn't talk.
The meeting did not start off too well. She started telling us how they needed our cash in order to make their yearly bonus. I explained that we would not be able to pay them, and we were looking for a payment plan where we could push the payment out into 2000. She was not eager to do that.
Every time I explained that we could not pay, she explained that they needed our cash so they could get their bonus. I then brought up the fact that we were in this predicament because of their inability to deliver the instrument on time. She apologized, and then told me that she needed our cash to make their bonus.
I said that if we did not get relief, we would have to file for bankruptcy. She said that didn't matter to her, as long as she got her cash.
This meeting lasted pretty long into the evening. I was getting frustrated, and I could tell she was also.
I finally said, if you do not give me a payment plan, I am going to file for bankruptcy in the morning. She said "Well, you have to do what you have to do, and so do I. I need that cash"
So I got up to leave and said we were filing as soon as the courts opened. She said OK, and then turned to one of her minions and asked, "What does "filing for bankruptcy" mean, anyway?"
I was sort of flabbergasted. I said:
"It means you won't be getting your bonus"
We filed in the morning.
In spite of raising over $20 million in equity and $14 million in debt we were quickly running out of cash. We had to close several sales or an additional round of funding to make the company work.
Reluctantly, I said yes.
The Board put me into the role and I immediately had to hire a CFO. I ended up hiring a fellow who became a very close friend (battle scars). I kept telling him we had plenty of cash (well over a million dollars) but he never really asked how much we were spending. Alas, we were spending WAY too much.
So first we tried to raise more money. We had a term sheet from a young and up and coming Private Equity firm based in Lime Rock, CT. The problem was the "pre-money" valuation (that is, what share price they were willing to pay for our stock) was $12 million. Yipes! Our last "post-money" (after our last round of funding) valuation was $45 million. That was quite a "down round". None of the current investors were willing to see such dilution.
So we focused on sales. We really had a pretty spectacular growth rate - in 1998 we sold only about $200k worth of data, and in 1999 we sold over $2 million! But our burn rate (cash out minus cash in) was about $2.5 million a month. Yipes!
My CFO told me that we had to get relief from our debt obligations, or we would be in violation of our loan covenants. (you had to keep a certain amount of cash or the loan could be called. There were many of these types of rules we had to follow)
Our biggest debtor (other than the loan with Third Coast Capital) was with Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the instrument we were using to collect our data. We had a payment due in October, and if we paid it, all our loans would be called.
It seemed like it would be a simple thing to go to Lockheed and ask that we reschedule payments. (there is a lot of history that I am leaving out here. The instrument we had was delivered very late, which meant that we missed the oil price peak, which meant that oil companies were cutting back on exploration, which meant that nobody wanted to buy our data. For want of a nail...)
But nothing with a large government contractor is ever simple.
This division of Lockheed we were dealing with (Lockheed Martin Federal Systems - they also made submarines) had never had a private client before. They were so naive that when it was obvious that they were not going to make the contracted date for delivery of one of our instruments, they told us that the price was going up (!!). We pointed out that in the contract, if they missed delivery, they had to pay a penalty. They said it never worked that way with the government. (I guess!)
So my CFO and I showed up in Manassas, Virginia on September 30, 1999. We had a meeting arranged with the head of the division, her finance guy, and a bunch of other people who didn't talk.
The meeting did not start off too well. She started telling us how they needed our cash in order to make their yearly bonus. I explained that we would not be able to pay them, and we were looking for a payment plan where we could push the payment out into 2000. She was not eager to do that.
Every time I explained that we could not pay, she explained that they needed our cash so they could get their bonus. I then brought up the fact that we were in this predicament because of their inability to deliver the instrument on time. She apologized, and then told me that she needed our cash to make their bonus.
I said that if we did not get relief, we would have to file for bankruptcy. She said that didn't matter to her, as long as she got her cash.
This meeting lasted pretty long into the evening. I was getting frustrated, and I could tell she was also.
I finally said, if you do not give me a payment plan, I am going to file for bankruptcy in the morning. She said "Well, you have to do what you have to do, and so do I. I need that cash"
So I got up to leave and said we were filing as soon as the courts opened. She said OK, and then turned to one of her minions and asked, "What does "filing for bankruptcy" mean, anyway?"
I was sort of flabbergasted. I said:
"It means you won't be getting your bonus"
We filed in the morning.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Bell Geospace
I returned to the US, bought a house in the Houston Heights, and decided that I would not work for a while.
Due to personal circumstances beyond the scope of this blog, that didn't happen. So when my old boss from Landmark called me and said he was recruited to run a start-up data company, I said yes.
The company, Bell Geospace, had secured the rights to an instrument invented for stealth submarine navigation - a Gravity Gradiometer. It was about the coolest thing I had ever seen:
;
Due to personal circumstances beyond the scope of this blog, that didn't happen. So when my old boss from Landmark called me and said he was recruited to run a start-up data company, I said yes.
The company, Bell Geospace, had secured the rights to an instrument invented for stealth submarine navigation - a Gravity Gradiometer. It was about the coolest thing I had ever seen:
;It was designed to measure the first dervivative of gravity. Now, since we all know that gravity is a vector, so the first derivative of a vector is a nine component tensor. We also know that because of self similarity (the xy component is equal to the yx component, etc) there are only five unique components of that nine component tensor.
But more to the point, the instrument (which we dubbed the "FTG" or Full Tensor Gradiometer (yes, I came up with that. Just as I did Full Wave Seismic.)) had to measure the difference in gravity between two points about five inches apart.
Concede that it did, and let me get on with the story.
We knew that there was great potential for this data. If you could find a way to combine this information with seismic data, you could make the seismic data much more valuable. Indeed, if you could combine this data with seismic data during processing, it would be possible to determing the size, shape, and thickness of subsurface salt bodies. That is important because salt is impervious to oil and gas, and does a good job trapping it. But salt is also a great reflector of sounds waves (for seismic imaging) so it hard to "see" through.
We decided that to make this company successful, we needed to go all in, all the way. So I started as the VP of Sales, but quickly took over at Chief Operating Officer. In that roll we raised a bunch of money, hired a lot of people, bought (and sank) a boat, opened an overseas office, chartered a couple of boats (that didn't sink) and generally had a grand old time.
Our problem, as with many small companies, was that our sales did not come close to keeping up with our expenditures. We hired over 60 people any never had more that $2 million a year in sales. We were burning (ie, spending more than we were taking in) about $1.5 million a month. We were cursed with cash. We had a CEO, a COO, a CFO (and a controller), an Ops Manager, two or three salesmen, an overseas office, and a charter on two big boats. (I won't go into the vessel that sank. It was a SWATH [small waterplane area twin hull] vessel originally designed as a fishing boat. We made mistakes)
We had great plans, great marketing, it is just that the industry was not ready for us. Then oil dropped to about $9/bbl (those bad old days) and the demand dried up as well.
As we were running out of cash, the Board of Directors asked me if I would take over as CEO. (remember, the previous CEO was (and is) a good friend of mine) I said OK, but prepared them for the fact that we might have to file for bankruptcy.
They were prepared, I was promoted, and we finally filed for Chapter 11 protection. I think that is worth its own entry.
But more to the point, the instrument (which we dubbed the "FTG" or Full Tensor Gradiometer (yes, I came up with that. Just as I did Full Wave Seismic.)) had to measure the difference in gravity between two points about five inches apart.
Concede that it did, and let me get on with the story.
We knew that there was great potential for this data. If you could find a way to combine this information with seismic data, you could make the seismic data much more valuable. Indeed, if you could combine this data with seismic data during processing, it would be possible to determing the size, shape, and thickness of subsurface salt bodies. That is important because salt is impervious to oil and gas, and does a good job trapping it. But salt is also a great reflector of sounds waves (for seismic imaging) so it hard to "see" through.
We decided that to make this company successful, we needed to go all in, all the way. So I started as the VP of Sales, but quickly took over at Chief Operating Officer. In that roll we raised a bunch of money, hired a lot of people, bought (and sank) a boat, opened an overseas office, chartered a couple of boats (that didn't sink) and generally had a grand old time.
Our problem, as with many small companies, was that our sales did not come close to keeping up with our expenditures. We hired over 60 people any never had more that $2 million a year in sales. We were burning (ie, spending more than we were taking in) about $1.5 million a month. We were cursed with cash. We had a CEO, a COO, a CFO (and a controller), an Ops Manager, two or three salesmen, an overseas office, and a charter on two big boats. (I won't go into the vessel that sank. It was a SWATH [small waterplane area twin hull] vessel originally designed as a fishing boat. We made mistakes)
We had great plans, great marketing, it is just that the industry was not ready for us. Then oil dropped to about $9/bbl (those bad old days) and the demand dried up as well.
As we were running out of cash, the Board of Directors asked me if I would take over as CEO. (remember, the previous CEO was (and is) a good friend of mine) I said OK, but prepared them for the fact that we might have to file for bankruptcy.
They were prepared, I was promoted, and we finally filed for Chapter 11 protection. I think that is worth its own entry.
Saturday, April 9, 2011
Cashed out and sent home. An intermission
After Landmark was purchased by Halliburton, I decided it was time to return to the US and try something new.
First, I had to find my replacement for Halliburton. I identified the regional manager for IBM, and recruited him pretty hard. This turned out to be the best thing that ever happened to him. He reluctantly took the job, and we overlapped for a short while.
Here is a funny anecdote: Landmark, and now Halliburton, had quarterly sales meetings where the regional VPs would get together with our boss and thrash out what the following quarter's sales goals would be. As you can imagine, this was always an interesting give and take, because we were a public company that gave regular guidance to the stock market. The VPs pushed for as low a number that was acceptable, our boss (and the CEO) always pushed for the highest number possible.
In my last QSOR (Quarterly Sales and Operations Report) I was accompanied by my successor. But since he was so new, I was the one who made the presentation. SO I got up in front of the group, and pitched what I thought was a fair number.
At this point, my boss (who looked and acted like a high school football coach) said that I was sandbagging, and that the number I presented was too low. He knew that I was leaving the company very, very soon.
So I just looked at the new VP (who had just flown in from Kuala Lumpur) and said, "OK Hank (my boss), what do you want it to be?" he gave me a number something like 20% higher than mine. I smiled and said "I am sure that Koid (my successor) will have no problem hitting that number"
I am not sure what Koid thought, but that was his new target.
We had fun at these quarterly meetings. We introduced new selling techniques, new products, new marketing plans.
One other story from my last QSOR is that my boss asked who would like to introduce the marketing VP to the group. Nobody seemed too interested, so in the interest of fun, I volunteered to do so. She was so upset that right before I got on stage she came and asked me, sotto voce to please not embarrass her. Of course I did not. I gave a great introduction, stressing the importance of Marketing to the company (which I honestly believe, to this day)
Then I came home, took a couple of months off, and started with a brand new company.
That's up next.
First, I had to find my replacement for Halliburton. I identified the regional manager for IBM, and recruited him pretty hard. This turned out to be the best thing that ever happened to him. He reluctantly took the job, and we overlapped for a short while.
Here is a funny anecdote: Landmark, and now Halliburton, had quarterly sales meetings where the regional VPs would get together with our boss and thrash out what the following quarter's sales goals would be. As you can imagine, this was always an interesting give and take, because we were a public company that gave regular guidance to the stock market. The VPs pushed for as low a number that was acceptable, our boss (and the CEO) always pushed for the highest number possible.
In my last QSOR (Quarterly Sales and Operations Report) I was accompanied by my successor. But since he was so new, I was the one who made the presentation. SO I got up in front of the group, and pitched what I thought was a fair number.
At this point, my boss (who looked and acted like a high school football coach) said that I was sandbagging, and that the number I presented was too low. He knew that I was leaving the company very, very soon.
So I just looked at the new VP (who had just flown in from Kuala Lumpur) and said, "OK Hank (my boss), what do you want it to be?" he gave me a number something like 20% higher than mine. I smiled and said "I am sure that Koid (my successor) will have no problem hitting that number"
I am not sure what Koid thought, but that was his new target.
We had fun at these quarterly meetings. We introduced new selling techniques, new products, new marketing plans.
One other story from my last QSOR is that my boss asked who would like to introduce the marketing VP to the group. Nobody seemed too interested, so in the interest of fun, I volunteered to do so. She was so upset that right before I got on stage she came and asked me, sotto voce to please not embarrass her. Of course I did not. I gave a great introduction, stressing the importance of Marketing to the company (which I honestly believe, to this day)
Then I came home, took a couple of months off, and started with a brand new company.
That's up next.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Landmark V, part two. So what exactly did you DO in Asia?
One of the themes of my career has been to seek out jobs that nobody else wanted. Or jobs that had no apparent route to success. My theory was that if you go to a place where everyone assumes you will fail, it will be easy to succeed. It has worked so far.
The APO group at Landmark had been under-performing the rest of Landmark for several years. The Company had replaced their long term VP (who coincidentally started the same day at Landmark that I did) with a fellow who was running a competitor's field offices in Asia. He hired many of his old friends, and worked diligently to try and change the Landmark culture into his previous company's culture. It did not work. There was an employee revolt, and he was let go.
I came to Asia where employee discontent was rampant. My first job was to reassure the people working there that their concerns were going to be taken seriously. I had several people ask me if my first action would be to fire them. (These conversations took place in the middle of the night for me, as I was still in Caracas). I let everyone know that I would make my personnel decisions based on performance, not on rumors.
Then I had to visit all the clients and let them know that the Company would continue to honor our commitments to them, and to make sure that they would be able to get their jobs done with our software. We made many more technical people available to help the clients, and we saw an increase in sales as a result. We increased sales 75% in a year, and profitability 105% in the same period.
The Company was also in the process of changing our business model to concentrate more on services, and less on product sales. We also reduced the responsibility of the regional VPs by moving marketing, pre-sales, and software support out of the regions in to global organizations. Some of the VPs were less than enthusiastic for these changes.
The Company did see an increase in sales during this period, though one would be hard pressed to say that there was an corresponding increase in profits.
But it did have the effect of making the Company more attractive as an acquisition target.
As I recall there were three companies that were interesting in purchasing Landmark. The end result was that Halliburton under Dick Cheney (yes, I met him) purchased the company.
I decided that HAL would not be the best thing for me, so I decided to leave the company.
So now it was time to move back to the US, and find something else interesting to pursue.
The APO group at Landmark had been under-performing the rest of Landmark for several years. The Company had replaced their long term VP (who coincidentally started the same day at Landmark that I did) with a fellow who was running a competitor's field offices in Asia. He hired many of his old friends, and worked diligently to try and change the Landmark culture into his previous company's culture. It did not work. There was an employee revolt, and he was let go.
I came to Asia where employee discontent was rampant. My first job was to reassure the people working there that their concerns were going to be taken seriously. I had several people ask me if my first action would be to fire them. (These conversations took place in the middle of the night for me, as I was still in Caracas). I let everyone know that I would make my personnel decisions based on performance, not on rumors.
Then I had to visit all the clients and let them know that the Company would continue to honor our commitments to them, and to make sure that they would be able to get their jobs done with our software. We made many more technical people available to help the clients, and we saw an increase in sales as a result. We increased sales 75% in a year, and profitability 105% in the same period.
The Company was also in the process of changing our business model to concentrate more on services, and less on product sales. We also reduced the responsibility of the regional VPs by moving marketing, pre-sales, and software support out of the regions in to global organizations. Some of the VPs were less than enthusiastic for these changes.
The Company did see an increase in sales during this period, though one would be hard pressed to say that there was an corresponding increase in profits.
But it did have the effect of making the Company more attractive as an acquisition target.
As I recall there were three companies that were interesting in purchasing Landmark. The end result was that Halliburton under Dick Cheney (yes, I met him) purchased the company.
I decided that HAL would not be the best thing for me, so I decided to leave the company.
So now it was time to move back to the US, and find something else interesting to pursue.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)